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COMMENT
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION CONTESTS AND
RECOUNT PROCEEDINGS: A CRITICAL
DIFFERENCE
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state decisions have generally held that Congress
has jurisdiction over the general elections of a United States Con-
gressman.' The courts, therefore, have refused to determine which
candidate received the highest total vote in a congressional elec-
tion. This is true regardless of how the issue was raised: whether
in an action contesting the right of a particular candidate to assume
a congressional seat, 2 or in an action to have the courts supervise
or order a recount of the votes.3
The courts have suggested three objections to the granting of
relief in congressional election cases.4 First, relief has been de-
nied because of the lack of a statute providing for an election
1. Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948) (primary elec-
tion); Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (involving a delegate
to Congress); Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa 1964); Koegh
v. Horner, 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. 111. 1934); In re Voorhis, 291 F. 673 (S.D.N.Y.
1923); In re Executive, 12 Fla. 686 (Sup. Ct. 1869); Burchell v. State Board
of Election Commissioners, 252 Ky. 823, 68 S.W.2d 427 (1934); McLeod v.
Kelly, 304 Mich. 120, 7 N.W.2d 240 (1942); Belknap v. Board of Canvassers,
94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W. 376 (1893); In re Youngdale, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d
459 (1950); In re Williams' Contest, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936);
State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); Laxalt
v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964); Britt v. Board of Canvassers,
172 N.C. 797, 90 S.E. 1005 (1916); Smith v. Polk, 135 Ohio St. 70, 19 N.E.2d
281 (1939); State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d
504 (1946); see Application of James, 241 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
See generally 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 330 (1966); 29 C.J.S. Elections
§ 252 (1965); 91 C.J.S. United States § 16 (1955).
2. Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964); see Burchell v.
State Board of Election Commissioners, 252 Ky. 823, 68 S.W.2d 427 (1934);
McLeod v. Kelly, 304 Mich. 120, 7 N.W.2d 240 (1942).
3. Belknap v. Board of Canvassers, 94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W. 376 (1893);
In re Williams' Contest, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936) (rejecting the
reasoning of an earlier decision allowing Congressional recount); see Dine-
man v. Board of State Canvassers, 198 Mich. 135, 164 N.W. 492 (1917);
cf. State ex rel. Beaman v. Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 190, 96 N.E.2d 671 (1951);
Bell v. Pike, 53 N.H. 473 (1873). See generally, 62 MICH. L. REv. (1963-64).
4. The decisions usually do not delineate the three objections in a
particular decision, but often intermingle the objections at the expense of a
concise statement of the court's reasoning.
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contest or recount proceeding. 5 Second, it has been held that a
court's decision on any congressional election matter would vio-
late the right of Congress to judge the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members6 as provided in article I, section 5 of
the United States Constitution.7 Third, courts have objected to
giving relief because such a determination by the courts concern-
ing congressional elections would amount merely to an advisory
opinion which could not be enforced in Congress.
8 These three
objections have been the reasons for the unanimous rejection of
judicial relief in any congressional election contest case,
9 and the
basis of the general rule that courts have no jurisdiction over the
election of representatives to Congress.10 Several courts have held,
however, that state legislatures may provide for recounts in con-
gressional elections, and that such recounts may be enforced
or supervised by the state courts." This Comment will discuss
the applicability of each of the three objections, first to a con-
gressional contest proceeding, and secondly, to a congressional re-
count proceeding to determine whether a court enforced remedy
should be granted in either instance in a general election.
I. THE FIRST OBJECTION: ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
A. Contest Proceedings
It was established at common law that in the absence of statu-
tory authority no judicial contest proceeding was permitted in
5. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa 1964);
In re Youngdale, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950); Wickersham v. State
Election Board, 357 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960) (dictum).
6. Belknap v. Board of Canvassers, 94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W. 376 (1893);
State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); see In
re Williams' Contest, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936); McLeod v. Kelly,
304 Mich. 120, 7 N.W.2d 240 (1942). See generally, 107 A.L.R. 205 (1937).
7. Article I, § 5 provides in part: "Each House shall be the Judge
of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members. .. ."
8. See, e.g., Burchell v. State Board of Election Commissioners, 252
Ky. 823, 68 S.W.2d 427 (1934); State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn.
406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964)
(dictum).
9. But see Blackburn v. Hall, 115 Ga. App. 235, 154 S.E.2d 392 (1967).
10. In re Youngdale, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950); see
Burchell v. State Board of Election Commissioners, 252 Ky. 823, 68 S.W.2d
427 (1934); In re Williams' Contest, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936);
cf. State ex rel. Acker v. Reeves, 229 Ind. 126, 95 N.E.2d 838 (1951).
11. Blackburn v. Hall, 115 Ga. App. 235, 154 S.E.2d 392 (1967); Ode-
gard v. Olson, 264 Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717 (1963) (concurring opinions);
Carson v. Kalisch, 89 N.J.L. 458, 99 A. 199 (1916) aff'd Carson v. Scully,
90 N.J.L. 295, 101 A. 289, 295 (1917); Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 216
N.Y. 732, 110 N.E. 776 (1915) (leading case); Wickersham v. State Election
Board, 57 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960); see, Macy v. Clayton, 277 App. Div. 1131,
101 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1950) (dictum); State ex rel. Husting v. State Board of
Canvassers, 159 Wis. 216, 150 N.W. 542 (1915); cf. In re Thirty-Second Con-
gressional District, 256 Pa. 342, 100 A. 825 (1917).
[Vol. 72
any election.12 The courts have refused to decide any questions
concerning an election contest solely because a statutory remedy
was absent. Even though Congress has passed a congressional elec-
tion contest statute, 13 it is clear that Congress did not give the
federal or state courts any jurisdiction to determine the rights
involved.14 Any remedy sought under the statute must be in Con-
gress and not in the courts. The federal courts have consistently
held that they are without any jurisdiction in election contest cases
primarily because of the absence of any statutory authority
providing otherwise.1 In Koegh v. Homer," it was held:
The many volumes of election contest cases in which every
conceivable question has been raised with reference to
the right of persons to sit as members of Congress ...
bear mute but forcible evidence that this [federal] court
has no authority to be the judge of the manner in which
such member were elected. ... 17
While the majority of states provide for election contest pro-
ceedings in many of their elections, 8 most do not include a contest
proceeding for a congressional election. 9 Where the election con-
test statute is not construed to apply to a congressional election, a
fatal defect is created in any attempt to institute an election con-
test in the state courts. There are, however, two states which
expressly allow a judicial contest in a congressional election.
20
While the constitutionality of these statutes will be considered later
in this Comment,21 it is clear that the courts in these states
would not be able to deny jurisdiction on the objection that the
parties had no statutory right to an election contest proceeding.
22
Where the statutory right to a congressional election contest
exists, objection to it must be made for one or both of the reasons
yet to be considered.
12. McCall v. City of Tombstone, 21 Ariz. 161, 185 P. 942 (1919);
Johnson v. DuBois, 208 Minn. 557, 294 N.W. 839 (1950).
13. 2 U.S.C. §§ 201-226 (1958).
14. A federal or state judge may issue a subpoena, however, when a
contestant is desirous of obtaining testimony respecting a contested election.
2 U.S.C. § 206 (1958).
15. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa 1964);
Koegh v. Homer, 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934).
16. 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934).
17. Koegh v. Horner, 8 F. Supp. 933 at 935 (S.D. Ill. 1934).
18. See, e.g., CAL. ELECTrONS CODE § 20021 (West 1961); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 5941 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46 § 23-19 (Smith-Hurd
1965); NEV. REV. STAT. 293, 407 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 3291
(1963).
19. See, e.g., CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 20020, 20021 (West 1961); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 46 § 23-19 (Smith-Hurd 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.407
(1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1366 (Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-419
(1964).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
1701 (Supp. 1966).
21. See p. 438 infra.
22. See, e.g., In re Youngdale, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950);




Recount proceedings, like contest proceedings, are purely statu-
tory;23 since no applicable statute has been created by Congress,
the federal courts have no authority to order a recount in a con-
gressional election.24  Although Congress has not passed a law
concerning congressional recounts, state legislatures have done so
for many elective offices.25 Since most state statutes enumerate the
candidates entitled to a recount, the courts must initially deter-
mine whether the state recount provision was intended to apply
to a congressional election. If it can be determined that the stat-
ute provides for a recount in a congressional election, this will
overcome the first objection against granting such relief as an
applicable statute is present.
Where the state statute specifically mentions the right of a
congressional recount 6 or where the statute has been construed to
include a congressional recount,2 7 there is no question of the scope
of the statute. However, in those states which provide for a recount
in "any" election 2 8 determining whether a congressional election
was intended to be included is more difficult. While the courts
are divided on the issue,2 the better view would be to construe the
statute exactly as written to include a congressional recount.30
23. Abbene v. Board of Election Committee, 348 Mass. 247, 202 N.E.2d
827 (1964); State ex rel. McCormick v. Superior Court of Knox County,
229 Ind. 118, 95 N.E.2d 829 (1951).
24. See, Koegh v. Horner, 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934); cf. Peterson
v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa 1964).
25. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20,430; 15.20,520 (1962); CAL. ELEC-
TIONS CODE §§ 18530; 18531 (West 1961); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323
(1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1705 (Supp. 1966); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
122.100 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2301 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 54, § 135 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.06 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 23-2301 (1967); NEE. REV. STAT. § 32-1001.23 (Supp. 1965); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 293.403 (1963); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:28-1 (1964); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. § 26-392 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 251.510 (Supp. 1963-64);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 3261 (1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-6-9 (1966);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-476.1 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 16.1818 (Supp. 1952).
26. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20,430, 15.20,520 (1962); CAL. ELEC-
TIONS CODE §§ 18530, 18531; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (1967); GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-1705 (Supp. 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 1366 (Supp.
1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-277.1 (1964).
27. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.403 (1963); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:28-1 (1964);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 26-392 (Supp. 1967).
28. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2301 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 1152 (1964); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-2301 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 32-1001.23 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.403 (1963); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 19:28-1 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 251.510 (Supp. 1963-64); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25 § 3261 (1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-6-9 (1966); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-476.1 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 16.1818 (Supp. 1952).
29. See Caron v. Kalisch, 89 N.J.L. 458, 99 A. 199 (1916) aff'd Carson
v. Scully, 90 N.J.L. 295, 101 A. 289 (1917) (permitting recount). Contra,
Belknap v. Board of Canvassers, 94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W. 376 (1895).
30. See State ex Tel. Husting v. State Board of Canvassers, 159 Wis.
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This will permit the court to decide the constitutionality of the
statute directly, rather than dismissing the question at the ex-
pense of the plain meaning of the statute.
A similar problem of ascertaining the scope of the recount
statute is present where the statute makes recount proceedings
available to candidates for "district offices."31  Because a congres-
sional candidate is elected by district,32 it is logical to conclude
that a Congressman should be entitled to a recount in this type
of statute. However, in the states which provide for recounts for
"state offices,'" it appears that a congressional candidate would
be excluded by the express intent of the legislature.
34
No remedy should be given or enforced by the courts unless
a statutory authority exists for the remedy. Since no federal stat-
ute has given the federal courts any power in this area, they
have none. Where a state statute can be construed as permitting
relief in a congressional election, the state courts cannot object to
the lack of an applicable statutory proceeding. Where, however,
the statute cannot be construed as permitting a congressional con-
test or recount proceeding, the courts need to go no further in the
consideration of the case.3 5 The mere presence of the statute, how-
ever, does not mean that either a state enforced contest or recount
is necessarily constitutional. This is the second objection uniformly
raised in congressional election cases.
216, 150 N.W. 542 (1915):
What did the legislature mean by the language, "Any candidate,
voted for at any primary or election"? . . . When the legislature,
in language as plain as can be chosen to express an idea, de-
clares that "any candidate, voted for at any primary or election"
shall have the benefit of a particular remedy as in the act in
question, it would be taking more liberties therewith, than would
seem to us within the judicial function, to restrict it to such offices
it might reasonably have been made to apply and not to apply to
the rest .... How can the court say, with any fair degree of cer-
tainty, that the legislature did not intend just what its language
naturally imports?
Id. at 237, 238, 150 N.W. at 550.
31. See, e.g., MAss. G.N. LAWS ANN. ch. 54 § 135 A (1958); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 26-392 (Supp. 1967).
32. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572.
33. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 122.100 (1963); MASS. STAT.
ANN. ch. 54, § 135 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.06 (1962).
34. See Lane v. McLemore, 169 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1914);
cf. Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103 (1916). But see Harless v. Lock-
wood, 85 Ariz. 97, 332 P.2d 887 (1958) (primary election):
We believe that the duty enjoined upon us by A.R.S. § 1-211:
"... Statutes shall be liberally construed to effect their objects
and promote justice . . .", is applicable here. Hence we hold that
the use of the phrase "state office" . . . can properly be inter-
preted in its broad sense as encompassing nominees for represen-
tatives to the Congress of the United States.
Id. at 102, 332 P.2d 890 (1958).
35. Courts, however, have usually supported their denial of relief
with the two other objections to be discussed rather than basing their
decision solely on the lack of statutory authority.
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II. THE SECOND OBJECTION: THE QUESTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Contest Proceedings
The courts have generally held that any decision by a court
concerning the validity of a congressional election is a violation
of article I, section 5 of the United States Constitution which pro-
vides that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own members .. ."- The objection of
constitutionality is often used to reinforce the courts' initial de-
nial of relief on the basis of lack of statutory authority.37 Article
I, section 5 is a restatement of the common law rule which gave
the legislatures the power to judge the elections and qualifica-
tions of their own members.3 This rule originated in English
Parliamentary law,39 and was perpetuated in America by the early
colonial assemblies. 40 At the time of the Constitutional Convention,
the rule was firmly established and there was little debate on grant-
ing Congress the same power.41 Similar provisions have been in-
cluded in the majority of state constitutions 42 which have given
the state legislatures identical power over their elections.
36. See, e.g., Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (involving
a delegate to Congress); Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa
1964); In re Executive, 12 Fla. 686 (Sup. Ct. 1869); Burchell v. State Board
of Election Commissioners, 252 Ky. 823, 68 S.W.2d 427 (1934); In re Young-
dale, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950); State ex Tel. 25 Voters v. Selvig,
170 Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d
466 (1964); cf. Application of James, 241 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1965); State
ex tel. Fleming v. Crawford, 28 Fla. 441, 10 So. 118 (1891); Opinion of the
Justices, 152 Me. 212, 142 A.2d 532 (1956); Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Or.
439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934).
37. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa 1964):
Plaintiff has failed to call the court's attention to any federal
statute which either expressly or by reasonable implication would
give the courts jurisdiction of this action .... In fact, it would
appear that under Article I, § 5 of the United States Constitution,
jurisdiction to pass on the elections, returns, and qualifications of
its own members is exclusively vested in each house of Congress.
Id. at 13.
38. See Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534, 29 N.E.2d 403 (1940); Dineman
v. Board of State Examiners, 198 Mich. 135, 164 N.W. 492 (1917). These
cases suggested that the rule was formulated in 1586 during the reign of
Queen Elizabeth. The exact date, however, is subject to some doubt. See
T. NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 26 (1962).
39. See generally 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 163; 1 KENT, CoM-
MENTARIES 220.
40. H. REMIcK, 1 THE PowERs or CONGRESs IN RESPECT TO MEMBER-
SHIP AND ELECTIONS 56 (1929).
41. See ThE FEDERALIST No. 59 (Hamilton).
42. See, e.g., DELA. CONST. art. 2, § 8; MAINE CONST. art. 4, Pt. 3, § 3;
MASS. CONST. § 3, art. 10; N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 47; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 9
(also art. 8, § 17); R.I. CONST. art. 4, § 6.
The overwhelming majority of state courts have held that they have
no power to interfere with the election contests of a state legislative official.
See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Sheid, 241 Ark. 908, 411 S.W.2d 5 (1967); Beatty v.
[Vol. 72
Spring 1968]
The fundamental reason for the adoption of provisions giving
the legislature the power to judge the elections, returns and qual-
ifications of its members was a fear that if the power were lodged
in any other body, such as the courts, the independence and the
existence of the legislature might be destroyed. 43  While some
suggestions have been made to divest Congress of its power to
judge its own elections,44 the principle has never been seriously
challenged by the courts in the United States. Other common law
countries,45 however, have now given the duty of settling legisla-
tive election questions to the courts, where it is felt that a more
impartial consideration of the facts can be acquired.
4 6
While article I, section 5 does not specifically say that Con-
gress shall be the exclusive judge of its elections, courts have
uniformly held the granted power is exclusive and that neither
the courts nor state officials have any jurisdiction. 47  Congress,
furthermore, has exercised its power over elections under article I,
section 5 in the form of a statute48 which outlines the method of
contesting a congressional election in Congress. Courts have sug-
gested that this statute provides an ample method for contesting a
congressional election 49 since Congress acts in a judicial capacity
Myrick, 218 Ga. 629, 129 S.E.2d 765 (1963); Rainey v. Taylor, 166 Ga. 476,
143 S.E. 383, (1928); Dinan v. Swig, 22 Mass. 516, 112 N.E. 91 (1916); State
ex rel. Ford v. Cutts, 53 Mont. 300, 163 P. 470 (1917). Contra, In re Hunt,
15 N.J.M. 321, 191 A. 437 (1937).
43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 59 (Hamilton).
44. See N. MACNEIL, FORGE OF DEMOCRACY: THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVEs 135 (1963); B. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (1955).
See also, W. WILLOUBY, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION 278 (1934); G. GALLOWAY, CONGRESS AT THE CROSSROADS 23 (1946).
45. Great Britain has changed the common law rule. Jurisdiction of
election contests now rests with the courts. C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 168 (1922). In Canada, election contests were
originally heard by a committee of the House of Commons, but are now
tried in the courts. Australia has also given their courts jurisdiction in
these matters. Id. at 169 n.2.
46. The fear that partisan politics will control an election contest
proceeding in Congress has been the primary argument in favor of giving
jurisdiction to the courts. See N. MACNEIL, FORGE OF DEMocRACY: TEI
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 135 (1963). But see Barrett, Contested Con-
gressional Elections in Recent Years, 54 POL. SCI Q. (June, 1939).
47. See, e.g., Peterson v. Sears, 238 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Iowa 1964); In re
Williams' Contest, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936); State ex rel. 25
Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); Laxalt v. Cannon, 80
Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964); cf. State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman,
249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946). See generally 26 Am. Jur.2d Elections
§ 330 (1966).
The courts have also held that neither the Governor nor the Secretary
of State has any power to act as judge in a congressional election. See, e.g.,
State v. Crawford, 10 So. 118 (1891); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 212,
142 A.2d 532 (1956); cf. Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d
484 (1950).
48. 2 U.S.C. §§ 201-226 (1958).
49. See McLeod v. Kelly, 304 Mich. 120, 7 N.W.2d 240 (1942); In re
Williams' Contest, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936).
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when considering an election contest.50 Furthermore, it is pre-
sumed that the legislature will act in good faith and admit a duly
qualified and legally elected candidate.51
There is serious question, therefore, of the constitutionality of
a state legislative attempt to provide for a congressional election
contest proceeding. The absence of congressional election contest
statutes in all but two states52 is an indication that perhaps
most state legislatures have considered such a statute void for
constitutional reasons. 5 The unconstitutionality of an action con-
testing a congressional election depends primarily upon the purpose
of such a proceeding; most statutory election contests include a
consideration of such matters as malconduct, ineligibility, bribery,
and illegality.5 4 The purpose of the proceeding is to finally deter-
mine the rights to a political office by permitting both parties to
present evidence to support their contentions. 5 The proceedings
involve more than a ministerial determination of the vote by bal-
lot.50 Because Congress has the power to judge the elections of its
members, it is very difficult to say that a state election contest
proceeding which attempts to judicially determine a right to of-
fice would not violate the power of Congress to determine that issue.
50. See Barry v. United States, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); In re Voorhis, 291
F. 673 (D.C.N.Y. 1923); Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1966);
cf. State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504
(1946).
51. See Opinion of the Court, 60 N.H. 585 (1881).
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1701
(Supp. 1966).
53. In Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964) the court
stated:
Because of the federal and state constitutional demands, it is
doubtful that the legislature, by enacting N.R.S. 293.407 (pursuant
to which the instant contest was filed), ever intended that it
embrace a contest for a seat in the United States Senate or House
of Representatives.
Id. at 591, 397 P.2d at 467.
54. See, e.g., DELJ. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5928 (1953):
Any person claiming to be elected to an office to be exercised in
and for any county, district or hundred, may contest the right of
any person declared to be duly elected to such office for any of the
following causes: (1) For malconduct on the part of the election
officers . . .; (2) When the person whose right to office is con-
tested was not at the time of the election eligible to such office;
(3) When the person whose right is contested has given . . . any
bribe or reward or shall have offered any bribe or reward for
the purpose of procuring his election; (4) On account of illegal
votes.
55. See Parsons v. Mason, 223 Ark. 281, 265 S.W.2d 526 (1954); Ap-
peal of Lord, 351 Pa. 469, 41 A.2d 661 (1954). See generally 29 C.J.S.
Elections § 1(1) (1965).
56. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-324 (1967); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-5506 (1949); N.Y. ELECTION LAw (McKinney 1964); TEx. REV. Civ.




The fact that a state legislature cannot enact an election con-
test statute without serious constitutional questions does not mean
that a state legislature is without any authority in congressional
elections. A concurring opinion in Odegard v. Olson57 stated:
Inasmuch as I was the author of the courts' opinion in
Youngdale v. Eastvold,58 which stated among other things
that "our courts have no jurisdiction over the election of
representatives to Congress." I feel that some explanation
of my present views are [sic] in order. That . . . is too
broad a statement .... Article I, Section 4 ... clearly
grants to the states the power to prescribe the manner of
electing Senators and Representatives to Congress. This
right, however, is circumscribed by Article I, § 5 . . . it
is not accurate to say that we have no jurisdiction over
elections. It is more proper to say that the states have
been given the authority to prescribe all steps necessary
to complete the elective process, subject to the over-riding
power of Congress. . . . Within the scope of the elective
process, our legislature could have provided for a recount
of the votes . . . and we do not doubt that Congress would
accept the final tally of the vote after a recount as well
as it would accept the original tally without a recount.59
The Court's reasoning suggests two pertinent inquiries. First, what
is the nature of the power granted under article I, section 4?
Secondly, what is the distinction between a contest proceeding and
a recount which might render the latter constitutional? The first
inquiry will be answered by considering: (a) the scope of the
power granted; and (b) to whom the power is granted. The sec-
ond inquiry will be answered by considering: (a) the definition
of a recount proceeding; and (b) its dissimilarities to an election
contest.
Article I, section 4 of the United States Constitution provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each
state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by law make or alter such regulations ...
The provision suggests very wide areas of regulation. The broad-
est area of regulation is the power over the "manner of holding
elections," which would include a regulation of the "time" and
"place" had they not been particularly mentioned in the provi-
sion. 60 In discussing the scope of the times, places, and manner
57. 264 Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717 (1963) (concurring opinion). Ac-
cord Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 216 N.Y. 732, 110 N.E. 776 (1915);
Wickersham v. State Election Board, 357 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960).
58. 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950).
59. 264 Minn. at 444, 119 N.W.2d at 721 (1963) (concurring opinion).
60. See United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272 (D.C. La. 1963);
State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker, 329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W.2d 533 (1932). See also
T. Farrar, Manual of the Constitution 2.52 (1867).
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provision, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words em-
brace authority to provide a complete code for Congressional
elections, not only as to times and places but in relation to
notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of
voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting
of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making
and publication of election returns; in short, to enact nu-
merous requirements as to procedure . . . to enforce the
fundamental right involved.'
While the court did not specifically mention recounting votes,
the language seems broad enough to permit the holder of the
power to establish a method for recounting the ballots. It has
been held, on the other hand, that this language is not broad
enough to permit a state conducted election contest.
6 2
The Supreme Court of the United States has construed section
4 as giving concurrent authority to both the state legislature and
Congress. 8 It seems, however, that this provision is an affirmation
of the principle that the states should initially provide the ma-
chinery for congressional elections.6 4 Where Congress has not
interfered by statute, the regulations are to be made wholly by
the state legislature. When Congress elects to exercise its power
under section 4 the scope of regulation becomes no greater,
65
the only effect of such a regulation is to supersede any state regu-
lation on the same matter and to bar any subsequent state action
in this area.6 6  As long as there is no direct conflict in regula-
61. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. at 366 (1932) (discussing the power of
Congress to supersede the state's regulations); see United States v. Man-
ning, 215 F. Supp. 272 (D.C. La. 1963).
The broad area of regulation in the times, places, and manner provi-
sion was recognized at the Constitutional Convention and criticized by
many who felt that Congress should not be given any power to supersede
the state's regulations. See J. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS, CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1781-1788 150 (1961); J. ELLIOTT 4 DEBATES 51 (2d ed. 1941);
P. FoRD, ESSAYS 105 (1892).
62. See Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Neb. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964); cf. Daniel-
son v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d 484 (1950). But see Pender-
grass v. Sheid, 241 Ark. 908, 411 S.W.2d 5 (1967).
63. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte Clark, 100
U.S. 399 (1879); cf. Larche v. Hannah, 172 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959).
64. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 13
(11th ed. 1954); J. BECK, THE VANISHING RIGHTS OF THE STATES 48 (1926);
G. McCRARY, AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS 107 (4th ed. 1897); cf. United
States v. Classic, 131 U.S. 299 (1941); Ring v. Marsh, 78 F. Supp. 914 (D.C.
N.J. 1948).
65. There is no support for the position that, because Congressmen are
federal officers, Congress has an infinite or undefined power over the
state's regulations concerning congressional elections. See Maurer, Con-
gress and State Control of Elections Under the Constitution, 16 GEO. L.J.
314, 323 (1927-1928); cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 249
(1921).
66. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See generally, J.
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tions, both the state legislature and Congress may regulate differ-
ent phases of the same subject simultaneously.
67
Article I, section 5 does not prevent a state regulated minis-
terial election recount which is a counting again of the votes
68
rendering an ascertainment of the results of the election as shown
by the ballots. 69 The recount is usually performed by a minis-
terial body appointed or supervised by a judge.7 0 The recount
certificate is not an adjudication of the title to office;7'1 rather
the results represent evidence to be used in a judicial determina-
tion of the rights to a political office.7 2 There is little reason
why this evidence should be excluded from the judicial contest
proceeding merely because Congress is sitting as the judge.
Defined properly, the results of the ministerial recount are not
different in character or purpose from the original count.7 3 A
recount, when instituted, serves as an integral part of the counting
of the ballots and is merely another step in that process.74 The
similarity and connection of a congressional recount to the initial
ballot counting process is clearly recognized in the California Elec-
tion Code:
LEwIs & A. PUTNEY, HANDBOOK ON ELECTION LAWS 239 (1912); P. REINSCH,
AMERICAN LEGISLATURES AND LEGISLATIVE METHODS 11 (1907). For a sum-
mary of congressional action pursuant to article I, § 4 see LEcISLATIV
REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong. 1st sess. 124 (1964).
67. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); J. MATTHEWS, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 362 (2d ed. 1940).
68. See, e.g., City of Barre v. Kidder, 121 Vt. 266, 155 A.2d 742 (1959);
Goff v. Young, 61 W. Va. 693, 57 S.E. 328 (1907). See generally 29 C.J.S.
Elections § 1(10) (b) (1965).
69. State ex rel. Peterson v. District Court, 103 Mont. 515, 63 P.2d 147
(1936); State v. Warren Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 351, 157 N.E.2d 732 (1959);
State ex rel. Watson v. Pigg, 221 Ind. 23, 46 N.E.2d 232 (1943).
70. A recount proceeding is not judicial merely because a judge super-
vises the proceeding. See State ex rel. Watson v. Pigg, 221 Ind. 23, 46
N.E.2d 232; cf. Hogg v. Howard, 242 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1951).
71. See Hogg v. Howard, 242 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1951); State ex rel.
Ainsworth v. District Court, 107 Mont. 370, 86 P.2d 5 (1938); Eaton v.
County Court, 140 W. Va. 498, 85 S.E.2d 648 (1955). But see State ex rel.
Beaman v. Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 190, 96 N.E.2d 671 (1951). A recount
proceeding is not res judicata to an election contest proceeding brought at
a later time. See Widick v. Ralston, 303 Ky. 373, 197 S.W.2d 261 (1946).
72. See Williams v. Bell, 184 Ind. 156, 110 N.E. 753 (1915). It has
been held that a candidate who was certified as having received the largest
vote could have a recount to prepare for a later contest of the election.
See State ex rel. McCormick v. State Superior Court, 229 Ind. 118, 95 N.E.2d
829 (1951); cf. State v. Circuit Court, 215 Ind. 18, 17 N.E.2d 805 (1938);
Reynolds v. Board of Canvassers, 117 W. Va. 770, 188 S.E. 229 (1936).
73. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 184 Ind. 156, 110 N.E. 752 (1915); Robin-
son v. Osborne, 314 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1958).
74. See Odegard v. Olson, 264 Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717 (1963) (con-
curring opinions); Wickersham v. State Election Board, 357 P.2d 421
(Okla. 1960); cf. State ex rel. Ainsworth v. District Court, 107 Mont. 370,
86 P.2d 5 (1938).
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The Legislature hereby finds that the computation of the
result of the votes cast for legislative offices [includes
Congress] 75 as disclosed by a recount is merely a continua-
tion of the computation originally made by the precinct
boards and by the official canvass thereafter made by the
canvassing board. Such a computation is for the most part
ministerial in nature, is conducted by a ministerial body,
and in no way impinges upon the constitutional guaranty
that each house of the Legislature shall be the judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members
since it is not binding on the Legislature
6
California, however, does not include congressional election con-
tests within its election code.77 The exclusion of a congressional
contest is reasonable since an election contest proceeding is meant
to be a final determination of title to office,78 while the recount
proceeding was not intended to infringe upon the power of Con-
gress to make this determination. The purpose of the recount
proceeding is merely to extend the process of the initial counting
of the ballots to insure the accuracy of the election certificate is-
sued by the state according to its laws. Since the states have
the power to certify the results of a congressional election in the
first instance,7 9 there seems to be little reason why states cannot
supersede this certificate with a more accurate tally of the
votes.8 0 Such a procedure would clearly be within the state's
power to provide for the manner of electing Congressmen, and
yet not violate the power of Congress to judge the elections, re-
turns or qualifications of its members.8 '
75. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 18530 (West 1961):
This article dealing with recount proceedings applies only to di-
rect primary elections at which candidates are to be nominated
for and to general elections at which candidates are to be entitled
to, one or more of the following offices: Member of Assembly,
State Senator, Representative in Congress, and United States
Senator. As used in this article "office" means one of the offices
enumerated in this section....
76. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 18531 (West 1961).
77. Compare CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 18530, 18531 (West 1961); with
§§ 20020, 20021; Compare NEv. REv. STAT. § 293.403 (1963), with § 293.407;
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 24-277.1 (1964) with § 24-419.
78. See CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 20116 (West 1961).
79. Most states have enacted statutes giving either the Secretary of
State or the Governor the power to issue an election certificate in a con-
gressional election. These certificates are usually sent to Congress or given
to the candidate to present to Congress. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17 § 205
(1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.395 (1963); N.J. REv. STAT. § 19:22-7 (1937);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-106 (Supp. 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3163 (1963);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-481 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-508 (1955); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 22-295 (1959).
80. See Carson v. Kalisch, 89 N.J.L. 458, 99 A. 199 (1916) aff'd Carson
v. Scully, 90 N.J.L. 295, 99 A. 199 (1916).
81. See Odegard v. Olson, 264 Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717 (1963) (con-
curring opinion); Carson v. Kalisch, 89 N.J.L. 458, 99 A. 199 (1916) aff'd
Carson v. Scully, 90 N.J.L. 295, 101 A. 289 (1917); Wickersham v. State
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Not all recount proceedings, however, would be sanctioned by
article I, section 4 since the fundamental basis for the constitu-
tionality of a congressional recount is its close relation, in both
procedure and effect, to the initial counting of the ballots. Where
the statutory recount is so coupled with the statutory election
contest proceeding as to be inseparable, there is serious question of
the constitutionality of a recount.8 2 While many states 3 have
provided for separate recount provisions, a few states8 4 have so
worded their election statutes as to preclude a recount without
also instituting a proceeding which amounts to an election contest.
The only decision construing a statute of this kind in a congres-
sional election is Blackburn v. Hall.85  In a split decision, 8 the
court held that:
Since a contest of this nature is specifically authorized by
the Georgia Election Code of 1964, § 34-1701 et seq., we con-
clude that the courts of this state have jurisdiction of a
proceeding brought under the provisions of the Code to ob-
tain a recount . . . in an election for a representative to
either House in Congress.
8 7
Election Board, 357 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960); cf. Rice v. Power, 278 N.Y.S.2d
361, 224 N.E.2d 865 (1967). See generally Comment, The Role of the
Courts in Election Contest Proceedings, 48 MINN. L. Rsv. 1181 (1963-1964).
The recount problem arises in state legislative elections too. In State
ex rel. Ainsworth v. District Court, 107 Mont. 370, 374, 86 P.2d 5, 7 (1938),
the court stated:
We are unable to see wherein a recount by the duly constituted
board of canvassers can infringe upon the right of a house of the
legislative assembly to judge of the elections, returns and qual-
ifications of its members. It is elementary that courts cannot try
contests for seats in the legislature and decide issues involved in
such contests; but the recount statute does not assume to set up any
tribunal wherein such an issue is to be tried. It does not assume to
recognize the existence of a contest....
82. See Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 216 N.Y. 732, 110 N.E. 776
(1915).
83. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20.430, 15.20.520 (1962); CAL. ELEC-
TIONS CODE §§ 18530, 18531; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2301 (1963); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANNZ. § 122.100 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1152 (1964);
MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 54 § 135 (1958); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 23-2301
(1967); NEB. REv. STAT. § 293.403 (1963); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:28-1 (1964);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 251.510 (Supp. 1963-64); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3261
(1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-6-9 (1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-476.1
(Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 16.1818 (Supp. 1952).
84. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (1967) (specifically
applicable to congressional elections); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1701 (Supp. 1966)
(specifically applicable to congressional elections); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 57.5 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.06 (1962).
85. 115 Ga. App. 235, 154 S.E.2d 392 (1967). The court in Wickersham
v. State Election Board, 357 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960), ordered a recount
in a congressional election under a contest provision, but a recount was
separately provided for in that provision.
86. The court was asked to do more than merely count the ballots in
the Blackburn case. The court was faced with a problem involving the
interpretation of overvotes which was decided judicially.
87. 115 Ga. App. at 239, 154 S.E.2d at 397 (1967).
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The difficulty in interpreting the decision is caused by the court's
interchangeable use of "contest" for "recount." If the court was
suggesting that the recount provision could be separated from
the contest provisions and that therefore the recount proceeding
was constitutional, it reached a proper decision. Because the re-
count provision was inseparable from the contest proceedings, how-
ever, it appears that the court was necessarily forced to conclude
that the entire congressional election contest statute was con-
stitutional."" In this respect, the decision may be construed as the
first case to hold that a state legislature can provide for a con-
gressional election contest proceeding in the state courts.8 9 If
the court intended this result, the decision is based on a very dubi-
ous proposition since article I, section 5 clearly grants the power
to decide election contest cases to Congress. In the absence of
any similarity to the original count, an election contest proceeding
would not be sanctioned by article I, section 4. For the same rea-
son, a recount proceeding, which assumes the existence of an elec-
tion contest proceeding and is an integral part of that proceed-
ing, is not sanctioned by article I, section 4. Only those recounts,
which are an integral part of the initial counting of the ballots,
are within the state's power over congressional elections.
III. THE THIRD OBJECTION: THE NUGATORY EFFECT
OF THE RESULTS
A. Contest Proceedings
Courts have stated that there is no authority for the proposi-
tion that Congress is bound by the rulings of a state court in a
congressional election. 90 Therefore, it is argued that any decision
by an official body of the state would be of no consequence since
article I, section 5 gives Congress the power of final determination
of an election contest. This argument, however, has never been
the sole basis for denying relief; it is usually mentioned in support
for deciding the unconstitutionality of a contest proceeding.
While a good argument might be made for the benefits of a
88. The statute considered in the Blackburn decision provides that a
recount is to be pursued by an amended pleading to an election contest.
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1705 (Supp. 1966). Extraneous evidence, clearly
inadmissible in the consideration of the original tally is made admissible
by the statute. Id. at § 34-1715.
89. There appears to be only one decision which has allowed a state
court to hold an election contest proceeding for a state legislative office.
See In re Hunt, 15 N.J. Misc. 321, 191 A. 437 (Cir. Ct. 1937). See also Jacobs
& Schmitzer, Report on the Proposed Revision of the New Jersey Election
Laws, 5 U. NEWARK L. Rsv. 183, 194-97 (1940).
90. See Blackburn v. Hall, 115 Ga. App. 235, 154 S.E.2d 392, 403 (1967)
(dissenting opinion); Burchell v. State Board of Election Commissioners,
252 Ky. 823, 68 S.W.2d 427 (1934); State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170
Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927).
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state-conducted contest proceeding, it is clear that the benefits of
such a proceeding cannot outweigh its unconstitutionality.
B. Recount Proceedings
As stated above, the constitutionality of a recount proceeding
depends largely upon whether it interferes with the power of Con-
gress to act as the judge of the elections of its members. It has
been argued, therefore, that such a proceeding would be of no
effect, since Congress could reject the findings of the recount,9 1
and institute its own fact-finding investigation. It must be con-
ceded that Congress does have the power to reject the result of
the state enforced recount, but this is no reason to deny its opera-
tion. The same argument could be made against the result of
an original count by the state officials, but the power of the states
to certify the original count has never been challenged.
The election certificate issued after the first counting of the
ballots is prima facie evidence of the title to office.9 2 After a re-
count, most states93 provide that the new certificate replaces the
old as prima facie evidence. Even after an original certificate has
been sent to Congress, the Congressional Elections Committee has
accepted a recount certificate, thus shifting the burden of proof to
the candidate holding the old certificate to show that he was
rightfully entitled to the office.9 4 Because of the procedure in-
volved, the states should be given the opportunity to take all con-
stitutional steps possible to insure accuracy in the certificates
they issue according to their own laws.
While Congress has the right to examine the ballots when de-
ciding an election contest brought pursuant to federal statute, there
is little doubt that Congress will find the results of the state
enforced recount of some value.95 Congress has, in fact, welcomed
the results of a state conducted recount as an aid in determining
an election contest begun in Congress.96 It would take almost two
91. E.g., cases cited in note 90 supra.
92. Spaulding v. Mead (1805), M. CLARK & D. HALL, CASES OF CON-
TESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS 159 (1934); Bassett v. Bayley, Id. at 255
(1813). There is also a presumption that the state canvassing board acted
correctly in their ministerial duties. See 1 HIND's PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 77 (1907).
93. See, e.g., CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 18535 (West 1961); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-2306 (1967);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:29-1 (1964); OHIO REV. CODE § 3515.05 (1966).
94. See Smith v. Jackson 1 HIND'S PRECEDENTS § 581 (1907).
95. See Blackburn v. Hall, 115 Ga. App. 235, 154 S.E.2d 392 (1967);
Odegard v. Olson (concurring opinions); Wickersham v. State Election
Board, 357 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960). In this regard, it is interesting to note
that in Laxalt v. Cannon, 80 Nev. 588, 397 P.2d 466 (1964) (strong decision
against permitting a congressional contest) a recount had been completed
without any adverse judicial comment.
96. See Ansorge v. Weller (1924) 6 CANON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 163 (1935); Beakes v. Bacon (1916) Id. at
§ 144; Smith v. Jackson, 1 HIND'S PRECEDENTS § 581 (1907).
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months before the new Congress could act; there is a possibility
that the ballots might become spoiled preventing an accurate
count by Congress. This is especially true where electronic vot-
ing devices are being used
7
Furthermore, the state legislature has a duty to assure its elec-
torate that it has done everything within its constitutional power
to insure proper election results. In this regard, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma stated:
Although Congress may have such power to refuse to rec-
ognize the results of a state recount we do not agree ...
that to accept jurisdiction herein and grant relief we will
be doing a vain or futile thing. We are not convinced that
Congress will refuse to recognize the result of a recount or
a Certificate of Election issued in accordance with the re-
count. If we entertained doubt on said score we neverthe-
less would be of the opinion that the respondents are under
a duty to comply with the election laws .... s
A miscount in a congressional election is as harmful as any other
election miscount and is equally entitled to immediate remedy.
In Carson v. Kalisch,99 the court ordered a recount and stated:
No sound reason has been advanced, and it may be fairly
said that none can be given why there should be any dif-
ferentiation of the will of the people, as expressed by their
votes in a Congressional district or in the city or county,
where recounts are usually permitted. 0 0
Because of the nature of the recount and the desirable purpose
it fulfills, congressional statutory recounts should be encouraged
by the state legislatures and the courts.
97. The use of electronic voting devices is one of the most signif-
icant changes in recent election laws. See The Book of States 1964-1965
17 (F. Smothers, ed. 1964). See generally, Willis, Electronic Vote Counting
in a Metropolitan Area, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 25 (1966); Harris, A New
Electronic Voting System 46 PUB. MANAGEMENT 53 (1964). Statutory au-
thority for the devices can be found in: CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 15600 (West
1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-6201 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 206.025
(Supp. 1965); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 23-2503 (1965); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 32-4, 132 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. §.293.295 (1963); OIo REV. CODE
Ar. § 3506.02 (Baldwin 1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-318.1 (Supp. 1966);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 109-11 (Supp. 1967). Recently Arizona, Arkansas,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma and Oregon have
also passed statutes favorable to the use of electronic counting devices.
Massachusetts, on the other hand, recently rejected such use.
98. Wickersham v. State Election Board, 357 P.2d at 422 (Okla. 1960);
cf. In re Thirty-Second Congressional District, 256 Pa. 342, 11 A. 825 (1917).
See generally The Role of the Courts in Election Contest Proceedings, 48
MINN. L. REV. 1181 (1963-1964).
99. 89 N.J.L. 458, 99 A. 199 (1916), aff'd Carson v. Scully, 90 N.J.L. 295,
101 A. 289 (1917).




The federal courts have consistently refused to grant any
relief in a congressional election dispute. This refusal has been
supported by the lack of statutory authority giving the federal
courts any jurisdiction in election cases and the conviction that
Congress has the power to judge the elections of its members.
Significantly, the only congressional legislation on congressional
contest proceedings establishes a procedure almost entirely autono-
mous of the federal courts.
Many state legislatures, acting presumably under article I,
section 4, have passed either congressional contest or recount pro-
ceedings applicable to congressional elections. To the extent that
these statutes prescribe the machinery for the judicial determi-
nation of the legality of title to a congressional office, they appear
to violate article I, section 5, which provides that Congress shall
have the power to judge the elections of its members. To the
extent, however, that a state proceeding is an ascertainment of the
results on the face of the ballots, the proceeding is constitutionally
sanctioned by article I, section 4. Recount proceedings instituted
pursuant to state statutes should be enforced or supervised by the
state courts. The results of such a recount will be of incomparable
value to Congress should an election contest proceeding be insti-
tuted there at a later time.
JOHN B. MANCKE
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